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This page contains 5 letters.

1. Letter from David S. Harrison to U.S. District Judge Larry A. Burns.
2. Letter from Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael G. Wheat to David S. Harrison.
3. Letter from David S. Harrison to Assistant U.S. Attorney Michael G. Wheat.
4. Letter from David S. Harrison to U.S. Attorney Laura E. Duffy.
5. Request to the Office of the U.S. Attorney, San Diego, Freedom of Information Act Department.


February 10, 2015

David Scott Harrison
E-62512
San Quentin State Prison
3-N-81
San Quentin, CA 94974

Honorable Larry A. Burns
United States District Court
Southern District of California
333 West Broadway, 14A Annex
San Diego, CA 92101

RE: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID SCOTT HARRISON, United States
District Court for the Southern District of California, at San Diego
(Case No. 88-CR-0200/88-CR-0900)

Dear Judge Burns:
Good day.
Please recall that as an Assistant United States Attorney you did prosecute the above-referenced matters, specifically two counts under 18 U.S.C., § 844(i), the pipe-bombing of an automobile and the arson of a ski-boat. Neither the automobile or ski-boat were then-actively used in interstate commerce or any activity affecting commerce.

In Jones V. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), the Supreme Court significantly narrowed jurisdictional reach of § 844(i), holding that § 844(i) covers only "property currently used in commerce or in an activity affecting commerce." See, Jones, 529 at p. 859. The Supreme court made clear that “a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce [,] see, Jones, 529 U.S. at p. 855, was insufficient for interstate commerce purposes.

The Jones holding rendered my § 844(i) convictions null and void -- the personal-use automobile and ski-boat were not in any way actively used in commerce or in any way affecting commerce, thus the United States never has jurisdiction to hale me into court on any felony charge.

Accordingly, as the prosecutor in the above-referenced matters, and knowing the facts and the current law, I argue that you have an ongoing duty to remedy the wrongful convictions described above. Your duty, if I may, requires that you inform the appropriate authority of the facts and law, such that an investigation may be taken to determine whether my § 844(i) convictions, either or both, are for alleged conduct that was not an offense against the United States. (e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n. 25 (1976); The State Bar of California, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 5-220; American Bar Association, Model Code of Professional Conduct, Rules 3.8(g) and (h))

While I acknowledge that your actions in 1988 may have followed then-existing, but terribly erroneous, law of the Ninth Circuit, we now must correct the wrongful convictions that resulted.

Accordingly, I request that you notify the appropriate authority of the wrongful convictions described above, making reasonable efforts to cause an investigation to determine whether may § 844(i) convictions, either or both, are for alleged conduct that was not an offense against the United States.

Please advise.

Yours Sincerely,
David Scott Harrison

cc: Office of the United States Attorney, Southern District of California, at San Diego.


U.S. Departmc of Justice

LAURA E. DUFFY
United States Attorney
Southern District of California

Michael G. Wheat Assistant U.S. Attorney
(619) 546-8437
Fax (619) 546-0831
San Diego County Office Federal Office Building
880 Front Street, Room 6293
San Diego, California 92101-8893

Imperial County Office
516 Industry Way
Suite C
Imperial County, California 92251-5782

March 10, 2015

#E-62612
Inmate David Scott Harrison
San Quentin State Prison
3-N-81
San Quentin, California 94974

Dear Inmate Harrison,

On February 10, 2015, you mailed a letter to U.S. District Judge Larry A. Burns, with a copy to this office, regarding you 1988 convictions for using a pipe bomb to blow up a 1978 Volkswagen van and torching a 1978 Reinell cabin cruiser motorboat, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., Section 844(i). In the letter you allege that Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), voided your convictions. You are mistaken. Your hectic daily routine and voluminous filings have obviously caused you to overlook the case of Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2008). This case may sound familiar to you as you were the plaintiff-appellant in that case. In Harrison, the Ninth Circuit soundly rejected your current argument. A copy of the decision is attached to refresh your recollection.

The Supreme Court in Jones held that "because an owner-occupied residence is not used for any commercial purpose does not qualify as property 'used in' commerce or commerce-affecting activity, arson of such a dwelling is not subject to federal prosecution under Section 844 (i). Your conviction did not involve a residence. Key to this holding is the limitation to real property (i.e., private homes or other dwelling places). The Court reasoned that residences are not implicated by the Commerce Clause because they have no active connection with commerce. However, the van you torched was driven and used for a "commercial business," manufactured overseas, travelled on federally funded interstate roads, and travelled in both interstate and foreign commerce. Harrison v. 0llison, 519 F.3d 952, 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2008). The boat you torched was also manufactured outside of California, travelled across state lines between Nevada, California, and Arizona, etc. Id. at 954. Unlike a house, your vehicles fall squarely within the lawful regulation of interstate commerce, even after Jones. Finally, keep in mind that vehicles of all kinds are considered especially connected with interstate commerce. United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547, 550 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that cars are themselves instrumentalities of commerce, which Congress may protect); United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that cars constitute an important instrument of commerce, and our highways . . . constitute perhaps our most vital channel or artery of interstate commerce); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1129 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the special relationship between vehicles and interstate commerce) (overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. Gallenardo, 579 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2009)).

In Harrison, although the Ninth Circuit was primarily concerned with its jurisdiction to hear your successive claims, the court also considered the merits of your underlying Jones argument and found that Jones did not "so change the law that it clearly placed [your] conduct outside the sweep of § 844 (i) . " 519 F.3d at 961. The court found that since you "stipulated that the van was driven and used in the commercial business, [this] would be sufficient to bring the property within the scope of § 844(i) under Jones." Id. You further stipulated to the fact that the boat was licensed and moored out of state, and that you frequently travelled across state lines with it to use it in other states. Id. The fact that various components of this vehicle were built and crossed state lines is also relevant to the analysis. In sum, both the boat and the van fall under the purview of the Commerce Clause. In sum, there is nothing in Jones that "voids" your convictions or entitles you to any form of relief.

In light of the fact that Jones is not new precedent and Harrison v. 0llison was decided nearly eight years ago, your letter to Judge Burns serves no legitimate purpose. Moreover, understanding that you will quite likely be spending the remainder of your life in prison, with the temptation of many idle hours, and that you have a long history of engaging in various forms of harassing and threatening communications, let me caution you not to send any vexing, harassing, or threatening letters. I am sending a copy of your letter and this response to the appropriate investigative agencies so that they are aware of, and can monitor your activities.

Very truly yours,

LAURA E. DUFFY
United States Attorney

MICHAEL G. WHEAT
Assistant U.S Attormey


March 16, 2015

David Scott Harrison
#E62612
San Quentin State Prison
3-N-81
San Quentin, CA 94974

Michael G, Wheat, Assistant U.S. Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
Southern District of California, at San Diego
Federal Office Building
880 Front Street, Room 6293
San Diego, CA 92101-8893

Dear Mr. Wheat:

Good day. Thank you so very much for your letter of March 10, 2015. From the rancorous tone of your letter I am reassured that you still think highly of me. Your letter deserves the respect of a response.

You’ll allow me to disagree with your erroneous views of the Court’s holding in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000). The Jones holding, constricting the jurisdictional reach of United States Code, Title 18, Section 844(i), was not limited to only rented residential properties. But you know that. For § 844(i) jurisdiction, the court held, the destroyed property must itself have been actively used in interstate commerce. (Jones, 529 U.S. at p. 859) The automobile in question was used but once or twice to deliver cakes for a friend’s business. Hardly active use. In Jones, the court held that “a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce[,] see Jones, 529 U.S. at p. 855, was insufficient for interstate commerce purposes. If you’d be so kind as to review the case files you will find that the automobile was not covered by § 844(i) jurisdiction. And the trailered ski boat had no active, passive or past, commerce use of any kind. That you know. If I may reiterate, the Jones Court made clear that de minimis use in commerce is insufficient for § 844(i) jurisdiction. Such instaces, the court opined, are for the states to prosecute. (Jones, 529 U.S. at p. 859) In other words, I had “the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. “See, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974).

You raise the question of counsel’s stipulations. Those stipulations were de minimus jurisdictional elements – then in vogue, but since found to be erroneous by the holdings in Jones. Moreover, as you know, jurisdiction can never be waived, lost or conferred upon the court. (Insurance Corporation of Ireland v. Companie des Bauxistes de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)); see also, United States v. Luong, 627 F.3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 2010) (“party may not waive a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction or invoke federal jurisdiction simply by consent”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Your reliance on counsel’s stipulations is misplaced. (Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry Co., 243 U.S. 281, 289 (1917); Universal Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 497 (1951); United States v. Miller, 822 F.2d 828, 832 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095,1099 (9th Cir. 2006))

The district court had no jurisdiction to act against me. Its judgments and orders are coram non judice, and must be disregarded. (Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 276 (1808).

“According to these opinions, a decision reached without jurisdiction is a legal nullity, and therefore, not a decision at all. The jurisdictional defect prevents the defective decision from ever becoming final.”

See, Billingsley v. Commission of the Internal Revenue Service (“C.I.R.”), 868 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989) (fn. Omitted); see also, Valley v. Northern Fire Insurance Company, 254 U.S. 348,353-54 (1920) (judgments taken without jurisdiction “are not voidable, but simply void, and this even before reversal.”), and cases cited. You know that to be the law, and your duty to enforce, even where you are loath to do so.

Accordingly, rather than oppose justice, prove its worth. Cause an investigation, as is your ethical duty, to determine whether the automobile was, in fact, actively used in commerce, and whether the trailered ski boat had any active commerce use. Find the truth, so that our time may not be spent in endless searches, and disputes.

Whether I will “be spending the rest of [my] life in prison,” as you suggest, is of no consequence. Be reminded that it was than-prosecutor, now-judge, Larry A. Burns, who in 1990 boasted he was “morally certain” I did not commit the murder but “bet” he could “win” a conviction. I hold no delusions and am quite sure Burns, st al., have in the past and will continue into the future to do all in their powers to assure my continued well-being within the CDC. I did not commit the murder, did not hire it, did not ask it to be done, nor did I arrange it; standing legally guilty, but factually and morally innocent, so whether I remain in prison or not is not on my conscience.

Every effort I make to correct the injustices I enjoy is “legitimate.” As for your retaliation against the exercise of my First Amendment rights, perhaps your pompous display of indignation is misdirected. I’ve committed no crime, nor have I any intention to commit any crime, in my quests fot justice, but there is the adage; “No crime a man commits in behalf of his freedom can be as great as the crimes committed by those who deny his freedom.” (Author unknown) Speaking of criminal behavior, may I humbly inquire whether Burns, or even yourself, will be sending the U.S. Marshalls out to threaten/intimidate me (I am informed of just such nefarious goings-on against those whom Burns dislikes)? “Today as in the past, we are not without proof that the exalted power of some governments to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is the the handmade of tyranny.” See, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).

So let’s have a real and fair investigation. If you are right, then the matter will be closed. In the event I am right, then the record will be formally corrected. In the event of a split, there will be a bit of each. The end result, regardless, is a win for us all. It is your duty, as it is Burns’ duty.

Please advise.

In closing, be advised that I have, this date, sent to your office a request pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act concerning certain acts you claim in your letter to have taken against me. Also, I have written to Ms. Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, requesting an investigation into the matters herein discussed.

As always, I remain …

Yours Sincerely,
David Scott Harrison


CERTIFIED MAIL 7012 2210 0001 0978 4408

March 16, 2015

David Scott Harrison
#E-62612
San Quentin State Prison
3-N-81
San Quentin, CA 94974

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney
Southern District of California
San Diego County Office
Federal Office Building
880 Front Street
San Diego, CA 92101

RE: MISCONDUCT BY ASSISTANT U.S. ATT0RNEY, MICHAEL G. WHEAT

Dear Ms. Duffy:

Good day.

Please find enclosed;

• My letter of February 10, 2015, addressed to Judge, Larry A. Burns;
• Letter of March 10, 2015, addressed to me, from. A.U.S.A., Michael C. Wheat;
• My reply of March 16, 2015, to Mr. Wheat; and
• My March 16, 2015, Freedom of Information Act requests for records and documents alleged by Mr. Wheat.

You will find in my originating letter nothing offensive. Nothing warranting Mr. Wheat's rancorous response. Certainly, my originating letter was nothing more than an exercise of my First Amendment rights. Contrary to Mr. Wheat's characterizations, there was nothing vexing, harassing, or threatening. No doubt such characterizations were set forth by Mr. Wheat to further his retaliation, such that his so-called "appropriate investigative agencies" would be all the more likely to act against my well- being.

Mr. Wheat's retaliatory actions are oppressive, unethical and likely, in violation of the Constitution and federal law.

I request that an investigation be conducted into Mr. Wheat's misconduct, and that I be provided with the findings of such investigation. It is my argument that Mr. 'Wheat's misconduct warrants his termination as a government attorney.

Further, I request that you instruct the full, disclosure of all requested records and documents of my Freedom of Information Act requests; transparency (I am not questioning your ethics, but have questions about others who might want to protect Mr. Wheat from himself). It is my sincere hope that the FOIA requests will result in full disclosure, so that we may be able to resolve our differences to the satisfaction of all parties.

As stated, I seek an investigation of Mr. Wheat's actions, and full disclosure of the records and documents requested of my FOIA requests.

Please advise.

Yours Sincerely, David Scott Harrison

encls:
Letter dated February 10, 2015;
Letter dated March 10, 2015;
Letter dated March J, 2015; and
Freedom of Information Act requests dated March 16, 2015.


DATE: March 16, 2015

FROM: David Scott Harrison
#E-62612
San Quentin State Prison
3-N-81
San Quentin, CA 94974

TO: Office of the United States Attorney, San Diego
Freedom of Information Act Department
Federal Office Building
880 Front Street
San Diego, CA 92101

PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
TITLE 5 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552
AND THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
TITLE 5 UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

In reference to the letter of March 10, 2015 (copy attached), at page 3, specifically the statement: "I am sending a copy of your letter and this response to the appropriate investigative agencies so that they are aware of, and can monitor your activities[,]" I, David Scott Harrison, request that you provide the following: all records, documents, information, writings, and tangible things, including electronically stored and/or transmitted:

1. that identify each and every one of the "appropriate investigative agencies" suggested in the March 10, 2015, letter; provide also street addresses;

2. that identify each and every other agency that was provided information about me due to my letter of February 10, 2015 (copy attached), as addressed to Judge, Larry A. Burns; provide also street addresses;

3. that identify each and every law enforcement agent, non-law enforcement and other persons, department/agency employees, heads, functionaries, office holders, officials, public servants, and all other persons and citizens, to whom were sent information, at the identified agencies (see, #1 and #2, above) and to any other location; identify also, the agency and location each identified individual is attached to; provide also the street address for each identified individual; and

4. from November 14, 1988 through March 10, 2015, 1/ provide copies of all "harassing and threatening communications, … vexing, harassing, or threatening letters[]" suggested by the March 10, 2015, letter that I have ever sent. Identify in each communication and/or letter the offending part, and identify to whom, and the address sent to, of any communication and/or letter I am accused of sending.

1/ The reason why I did not include my pre-conviction (prior to 1988) conduct, is because my harassing of Harry Wanket was fully exposed in the course of my federal and state legal proceedings. Let us not forget that Harry Wanket is an admitted serial incestuous pedophile whom then-prosecutor, Larry A. Burns, protected from prosecution and gave immunity to in exchange for Wanket's character assassination testimony against me. Apparently, in law enforcement circles, it is more criminal to harass someone for being a serial incestuous pedophile, than to be that serial incestuous pedophile. Such was Burns ethics and morals in his rabid urge to prosecute and convict me for a murder he boasted I did not commit. Yes, I harassed Wanket. I do not recall any threatening communications or letters (FOIA: Please provide copies to me, if such exist). So, if you'd like to resurrect the matter of Burns' protection/immunity for Wanket, I will be happy to compare my harassment to Wanket's serial incestuous pedophilia and Burns' embracing of Wanket.

I request legal justification for each and every deletion or excision made, as well as an index of all deleted or excised records. It is asked that the request(s) made be construed broadly with deference given to all Codes and Statutes urging liberal disclosure.

I ask that the request(s) herein be processed pursuant to Title 5 U. S. C. 552 and Title 5 U.S.C. § 552a, but that no fees shall be charged for locating, copying or delivering to me the requested materials without prior notification to me and my written authorization that such fees shall incur.

In the event of any deleted/excised records, please notify me of the process for appeal, including any statutory limitations period. I, of course, reserve the right to appeal any decision to withhold any requested materials.

NAME OF REQUESTER: David Scott Harrison
DATE OF BIRTH: 29 December, 1956
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 568-02-8692
ADDRESS: See, below

' I, David Scott Harrison, have, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, read the foregoing, and declare under the penalty of perjury, that the contents thereof to be true and correct, except as to matters stated therein upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.

DATE: March 16, 2015.

David Scott Harrison
#E-62612
San Quentin State Prison
3-N-81
San Quentin, CA 94974

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